This issue of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care contains two fascinating papers relating to the checking of anaesthesia machines. A small detailed simulation study from Wellington examines the effects of 'long shifts' and the resulting minor sleep deprivation on registrar performance in a routine case 1 . The slightly tired trainees spoke more slowly and spent more time fiddling with and staring at the intravenous fluids, although it is not clear if this was a bad thing. Perhaps they were actually a little safer. The startling discovery was that the preoperative checks of both patient and machine were performed cursorily and were incomplete whether the registrar was tired or not. This seems extraordinary when performance was being explicitly studied.
The first paper is from Owen's group at Flinders 2 . Covert observations of level two and three anaesthesia delivery system (ADS) checks were performed at three Adelaide hospitals. The results show poor compliance with PS31 Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems. This 'poor compliance' was not merely a label applied by the researchers due to failure on a minor item. Absolute safety basics were omitted-such as back-up oxygen and checking the machine prior to caesarean section under neuraxial block. The authors suggest that this "frequent noncompliance is indicative of a system failure" 2 .
It has been said that, "if the members of a work community cannot produce their own understanding of the reasons behind these recommendations, they will have a tendency to treat them as without inherent value, bypassing them whenever they become inconvenient to follow" 3 . The results reported by Garden et al 1 and Sweeney et al 2 suggest that this is currently the situation for some Australian and New Zealand anaesthetists.
The magIc OF checklIsTs
There has recently been widespread enthusiasm for the use of checklists in healthcare. Surgeon Atul Gawande promoted the work of intensivist Peter Pronovost (the michigan keystone study), led the World health Organization safer surgery Initiative (which produced a checklist) and wrote a bestseller, The Checklist Manifesto. however, Pronovost himself cautions, "widespread deployment of checklists without an appreciation of how or why they work is a potential threat to patients' safety and to high-quality care" 4 . The real heart of the keystone study was not about checklists, but about the creation of social networks with a shared sense of mission, the members of which were able to reinforce each others' efforts to co-operate with the interventions 4 .
avIaTIOn checkIng rOuTInes
Examination of Degani and Wiener's seminal 1993 paper on cockpit safety is enlightening 5 -they discuss checking routines rather than lists. The routines define team duties and encourage mutual supervision. There is a 'goldilocks' quality to getting a routine right: inclusiveness is good, but excessive length and redundancy are problems, especially when there is pressure to get a plane to take off on time (or a theatre list going). When prescribed routines were not ideal, some pilots developed personal nonstandard routines, chunking and focusing on what they considered to be critical issues.
allOcaTIOn OF resPOnsIbIlITy
PS31 does not adequately allocate tasks to individuals. We know the consultant is responsible, but should they physically carry out the checks? In a teaching hospital situation, the consultant, registrar and anaesthetic technician (or registered nurse) may all repeat checks. but should these be independent and, if so, how many are necessary? Or should a single checking process occur with verification by another observer? Practices vary, but usually the anaesthetic technician will arrive first and perform the 'full system check'. The full system check, including machine selfcheck, may still be underway by the time the next member of the team arrives. Should the machine selfcheck always be repeated as part of a doctor's level two check? repeating any check may be associated with resentment by the person who feels that the care and quality of their work is being questioned. The fact that the Adelaide team observed that the scavenging was turned off after the full system check suggests that the nurses expected a further check. In the teaching context, it is easy to understand the omission of the check in the lower segment caesarean section cases-"An important job had to be done and Everybody was sure that Somebody would do it. Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did it."
mOdern ads TechnOlOgIes
Anaesthetic machines do not always check themselves. We have no ability to scrutinise their internal programming work. Should we be anxious? In the film 2001: A Space Odyssey, the computer hal states, "no 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information". My new steam oven gives inaccurate opinions about the readiness of the meal. My last car would periodically send me a message in capitals saying "poor performance". I was never quite sure to which of us this message might refer. generally, modern machines are more reliable than their operators. Cars also have many built-in safety functions such as being unable to start when in gear. Perhaps the safety of more ADSs could be automated. When 'wouldn't' we want scavenging on? Perhaps the machine should to be unable to work without scavenging. however, most ads risks probably do not lie inside the mightily engineered bodies of modern anaesthetic machines. The rare problems that do occur, such as sudden ventilator failure 6 , are not usually prospectively detectable. however, circuit problems, drug errors and problems with syringe drivers are common.
TIme FOr a neW checkIng rOuTIne
The latest patient-safety thinking suggests that the proliferation and creation of rules that are hard to follow or seem pointless, and where failure to comply has no consequences for the individual responsible, results in the 'normalisation of deviance'-increasing risk and harm to patients 7, 8 . We, therefore, argued recently in this journal against the introduction of rules about the use of smartphones in the operating theatre 9 . however, ads problems can have immediate and devastating consequences. Maximising patient safety needs better rules for ADS checking. The replacement of PS31 Recommendations on Checking Anaesthesia Delivery Systems with an ADS checking routine would be a good start.
This routine needs to incorporate best practice human factors including defined personnel, a logical sequence in terms of anaesthesia workflow and appropriate physical cues. Sweeney et al 2 provide some ideas in their discussion. The routine needs to be realistic about time pressures and cognisant of contemporary ads risks (likelihood, detectability, preventability etc).
Anaesthetists need to own their new ADS checking routine. Doctors generally resist externally imposed protocols 10 and more senior anaesthetists have been shown to be more likely to violate standards 11 . The new routine must be tested in the simulator under both routine and stressful circumstances and with a variety of ADS equipment. A simulation research program developing a better ADS checking routine also provides a great opportunity to develop a library of modern ADS teaching vignettes. Anaesthesia experts need both an awareness of potential ADS risks and sufficient technical knowledge to provide resilience in a work environment filled with changing technologies. This knowledge and a new routine should prevent the checkers from becoming bored and ensure crucial safety checks are not left undone.
C. M. JorM
University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia reFerences
